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JAN 5 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Berlin Foreign Ministers' Conference

1. This memorandum is to acquaint you with activities which have taken place in Washington concerning the forthcoming conference of foreign ministers in Berlin on which you might wish to brief the Director.

I. MR. WISNER'S VIEWS ON ADVANCE PLANNING:

At a meeting in his office on 17 December 1953, Mr. Wisner told [REDACTED] Special Assistant to CPP; [REDACTED] Chief, Information Coordination Division; and [REDACTED] of the OCB, of his concern over the forthcoming foreign ministers meeting which he said was based on the assumption that it would be one of the "roughest" we've ever attended. He added he believes the Soviets will attempt to make the utmost propaganda advantage of the meeting.

Mr. Wisner pointed out that careful thinking and advance planning would be necessary to meet the Soviet threat at this meeting and said there was an immediate need to firm up our position and goals, to alert friendly press to what we hope to accomplish and to try to anticipate the Soviet line at the meeting and be prepared in advance to counter it. He also felt it was necessary to organize our own thoughts in order to exchange ideas with our allies. Dr. Craig reported he had met with [REDACTED] that afternoon to consider these problems.

II. PLANNING FOR FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE:

In checking on whether an inter-departmental planning group was being established for the Berlin meeting, we learned that no inter-agency planning had been undertaken. Through our regular liaison channels with State Department we discovered that there is a group working on the problem in the State Department whose work probably centers on preparing position papers rather than

psychological warfare

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psychological warfare planning. We also discovered that USIA plans to send [ ] deputy to [ ] to Berlin during the conference to oversee USIA handling of developments.

[ ] and others at the OCB are understood to have been giving advance thought to the question. [ ] informed [ ] of my staff, on 28 December that the OCB would probably have some plan on the subject. On 4 January [ ] reported that [ ] personally planned to bring the matter before the OCB board at its meeting Wednesday 6 January and that the paper would be circulated at that time. We have been unable to procure a copy of this plan and consequently do not know its contents.

### III. STATE DEPARTMENT POLICY:

The State Department issued a background policy guidance for USIA on 15 December which said that the most important emphasis of media activity should be "to picture the Berlin meeting as one at which real progress toward settlement of German and Austrian problems could be made and to indicate that the United States as well as its Western allies will make every effort to promote the achievement of these results."

### IV. USIA GUIDANCE TO OVERT MEDIA:

Based on the above-mentioned State Policy, USIA issued a guidance 18 December telling media to "place emphasis throughout its treatment of the Berlin conference on positive aspects of the Western attitude . . . and underscore that US, UK, France approaching Berlin meeting with open minds in the hope that real progress will be made toward a solution of German and Austrian problems and with the intention of doing everything reasonable to achieve tangible results."

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25X1 VI. CONTINGENCIES SUGGESTED BY CIA WHICH REQUIRE INTER-AGENCY  
CONSIDERATION:

25X1 [ ] advises headquarters that the onus for possible  
failure of the conference will fall on the West if such failure is  
due to Western refusal to accede to Soviet demands for advance  
25X1 agreement that a five power conference should follow the four  
power conference. [ ] is reported to be certain that no  
amount of propaganda will be able to convince either East or West  
Germans that such Western refusal is anything but a deliberate  
attempt to sabotage German re-unification.

25X1 [ ] asks if it would be possible for the western powers  
or the United States government officially to explain in advance  
to the East and West Germans why the Western powers must remain  
unyielding on prior agreement to five power talks or acceptance  
of the GDR regime because we refuse to sell Germans, Chinese or  
any other victims of Communism down the river into slavery for the  
sake of reducing cold war tensions.

Concern has been expressed that the communists may try to  
maneuver the conference into complete failure in order to break  
the will of Soviet zone resistance groups. [ ] raises the  
question of whether, in order to forestall such a development,  
it would be possible for an official statement to be made assuring  
the Germans that the West is against either a deal with the USSR  
at Germany's expense or complete abandonment of the Soviet Zone  
to the Soviet orbit.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION:

1. That a standing group be appointed on an inter-agency basis  
to plan for propaganda exploitation of developments at Berlin  
before, during and after the conference.

25X1 2. That a parallel working group for propaganda exploitation  
be established in Berlin to handle developments at the conference  
immediately based on long-range considerations laid down by the  
group here. [ ] at the  
meetings of this group and his activities should be geared to support-  
ing overt plans as they develop.

3. That President Eisenhower's atomic proposals should not be  
made an issue at the foreign ministers conference since:

a. they are

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a. they are important enough to warrant separate discussions,

b. if Molotov so chooses he could ostensibly approve the atomic proposal by agreeing to talks on it while continuing recalcitrant on everything else and thus appear to the world to have cooperated toward easing world tensions while actually doing nothing.

c. our main emphasis has been to deal with Germany and Austria and let nothing extraneous interfere. If we now introduce discussions of the President's proposal, we open the door for the Soviets to introduce any number of extraneous issues.



*for* C. TRACY BARNES  
Chief  
Political and Psychological Warfare

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FROM:

CPP

NO.

DATE

5 January 1954

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
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